Zantac Lawsuit


Researching drug company and regulatory malfeasance for over 16 years
Humanist, humorist
Showing posts with label Marketing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Marketing. Show all posts

Thursday, June 18, 2015

Whooping Cough - Seeing Is Believing





I've always given credit to the marketing moguls at GSK. They, in the past, have convinced people that they have an illness...even when they don't actually have an illness.

I was recently alerted to a new campaign by GSK regarding vaccinations for whooping cough (pronounced 'hooping' in the UK)

The video, even by their standards, is, I believe, typical of fear-mongering.

It depicts a grandmother as a big bad wolf because, it appears, that she didn't get a vaccine shot for whooping cough, ergo she is putting her grandchild at risk.

Ho hum.

The 30 second TV commercial runs with the tagline...

A couple takes their baby to visit their parents. Unfortunately, grandma might have whooping cough and could spread it to their baby. Whooping cough is a dangerous, spreadable disease that can be especially dangerous to infants. Make sure your whooping cough vaccination is up to date to keep your loved ones safe.

Glaxo have even created a special page that tells us all about how grandparents need to get the vaccine because they may be putting their grandchildren at risk.

The website even has a stark warning at the top, a photo depicting, once again, grandma as a nasty big bad wolf. (fig 1)


fig 1


Here's the video.





**If the video doesn't load on this page then it can be viewed here.

Bob Fiddaman.







Saturday, June 28, 2014

Pharmaceutical Ads Should be Allowed on British TV's





There are only two countries in the world that are allowed to air ads for prescription drugs, namely New Zealand and the good old US of A. This is called direct-to-consumer advertising, or DTC for short.

I'm calling for the British government to allow the same type of ads on British TV screens.

So, have I gone and signed a deal with the Devil, taken a kickback from the Pharmafia?

Nup.

I'll explain.

In the US it is the job of the FDA to regulate direct-to-consumer advertising, any ad that falls short of their rules and regulations is either not aired or taken back to the editing room.

In the UK that job, if ads were aired, would be down to the British drug regulator, the MHRA. Anyone familiar with our toothless drug watchdog will know that they have, time and time again, given antidepressants a clean bill of health where adults are concerned. They normally refer to the Committee on Safety of Medicines [CSM] when asked about the safety of antidepressants in this population. Bizarrely Prozac can be given to children and teens in the UK whereas in the US it's not recommended.

Advertising a prescription drug on television used to be a lucrative tool for the pharmaceutical industry. In the US, for example, Paxil was heavily promoted as the pill to cure shyness. However, this lucrative tool has now become the Achilles heel for the marketing departments of the pharmafia.

Now, they are legally obliged to list the side effects of the particular drugs they are advertising on US TV screens.

Here's an example of a recent ad for Latuda [lurasidone] - a new atypical antipsychotic for the treatment of "bipolar depression" and developed by Dainippon Sumitomo Pharma and marketed by Sunovion in the USA.

How would the British public react to this ad if it were aired halfway through Coronation Street or the X-Factor?




Personally, I think it would be a wake-up call to all those British folk who think the pharmaceutical industry are whiter than white.

Did you hear the list of side-effects mentioned in the 90 second ad above?

The first 20 seconds of the ad describes the product and what it is indicated for.

Let's just take a look at what happens after the 20 second mark.

Latuda is not for everyone.
Call your doctor if you have unusual changes in moods, behaviours or thoughts of suicide. Antidepressants can increase these in children, teens and young adults. 
Elderly dementia patients taking Latuda have an increased risk of death or stroke. 
Call you doctor if you have fever, stiff muscles and confusion as these may be signs of a life-threatening reaction...or if you have uncontrollable muscle movements as these may become permanent.
High blood sugar has been reported with Latuda and medicines like it and in some cases extreme high blood sugar can lead to coma or death.
Other risks include decreases in white blood cells which can be fatal, dizziness upon standing, seizures, increased cholesterol, weight gain, increased prolactin levels, impairment in judgement or trouble swallowing.
Avoid grapefruit and grapefruit juice whilst taking Latuda.
Use caution when driving or operating machinery.

The side effects narrated by the softly spoken woman end at 1.15. The final 15 seconds asks the viewer [you, the consumer] to ask your doctor for Latuda and that "bipolar depression" is treatable.

I find it remarkable that the marketing team in this ad have added the following narrative, "Call your doctor if you have unusual changes in moods, behaviours or thoughts of suicide. Antidepressants can increase these in children, teens and young adults."

Latuda is not recommended for children or teens yet they felt the need to throw up the warning. This is because they know that Latuda will more than likely be prescribed off-label to this age group, they know because they will probably promote it in such a way when their reps visit the doctors in their workplaces.

The ad, to me at least, is more about the illness than the product. What they are trying to do here is make "bipolar depression" sound as if it is life-threatening if left untreated, they are trying to convince the consumer that this condition is as bad as a cancerous growth on the lung. This is designed to make you, the consumer, think that the risks stated are worth it.

Bipolar depression is the name given to the depression experienced in those who have bipolar disorder [in other words, they experience depression as well as manic or hypomanic episodes]...at least, that's what we are told.

Now, the reason I believe that we, here in the UK, should allow such ads on our TV screens is simple.

People already on these types of drugs probably haven't read the patient information leaflet that accompanies these drugs, even if they have it's hardly as powerful as the spoken word.

Airing ads like the above on British TV screens would serve a purpose. It would show how dangerous these drugs are. It wouldn't just be bloggers like myself telling you how dangerous they are, it would be the actual pharmaceutical company who manufacture the drug.

Can you imagine if Carlsberg listed that you should call your doctor if you had thoughts of suicide or if drinking their beer could cause an increased risk in strokes for elderly dementia patients?

Imagine if Carlsberg told us...

"Call you doctor if you have fever, stiff muscles and confusion as these may be signs of a life-threatening reaction...or if you have uncontrollable muscle movements as these may become permanent.

"High blood sugar has been reported with Carlsberg and beers like it and in some cases extreme high blood sugar can lead to coma or death."

Would we still be clambering down the aisles at our local supermarket for the 'buy one, get one free' packs of Carlsberg?

Of course not.

So, why do people still ask their doctor for the drugs advertised on US TV?

It's simple, they are told that they have a condition. What they are not told is that the condition came about as a result of heavy marketing and DSM madness. The DSM is the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, a book that lists mental diseases [labels] - they are as ludicrous as the pills used to treat them.

I'm not suggesting for one minute that people don't suffer bouts of depression, they do. But the ad above, and ads like it, are not aimed at those people. The ad is aimed at the consumer who would have been convinced that his or her depression is more serious than your average depression.

I'm all for the MHRA sanctioning these types of ads. It will make the British public ask questions. It will also highlight how dangerous these types of drugs are... and how those that market them probably should be labelled with a mental disorder themselves.

Bob Fiddaman.










Monday, July 30, 2012

Glaxo's Lucozade Sport Fails Miserably





GlaxoSmithKline came under fire again…from BBC investigative reporter, Shelley Jofre, [again]
No mentions of their illegal promotion of antidepressant medication to children in this particular expose by the Scots ankle-biter Jofre, this piece was about their boasts and claims of their popular “energy” drink, Lucozade Sport. ‘Claims’ being the operative word here because that’s all they have, no science just trumped up claims aimed at you, the consumer.

I’ve not heard any stories [yet] of Lucozade inducing suicide or causing addiction, unlike Glaxo’s top selling antidepressant Seroxat [Paxil].  What we do know about Lucozade Sport is that one single bottle contains up to 8 spoonfuls of sugar.

What I find ironic is that GlaxoSmithKline are heavily involved with the dope-testing of athletes at the current Olympic games going on in London. Judging by the findings of Jofre, Glaxo should be getting their own house in order before weeding out the Olympic cheats.

A research team at Oxford University wanted to find out if Glaxo’s Lucozade Sport really did what it said on the bottle and in the multi-million pound advertising campaign seen in magazines, billboards and TV commercials up and down the UK. Their findings shouldn’t shock anyone who knows this company and their history of spinning clinical data.

Glaxo being Glaxo sent the research team over 80 studies that apparently proved that Lucozade Sport delivered the goods, goods such as drinking it makes you last longer and finish stronger - Ooh er missus, sounds like a tagline from a Carry On movie. [Insert Sid James laugh here]

The team sifted through the documents with 3 main criteria:

Quality of evidence
Size of effect
Who does it apply to?

What they found was that the quality of evidence was poor, the size of effect was miniscule and that Glaxo’s claims didn’t apply to the population at large who were buying Lucozade Sport. In other words Lucozade Sport has no impact on performance for ordinary people.

Are you surprised?

Back in 2010 I wrote about the hyperactivity link in Lucozade, a number of other suspect food colourings were found in Lucozade after a study by Southampton University, commissioned by the Food Standards Agency, identified 'psychological harm' caused by the additives.

Back then Glaxo were finding it difficult to find a replacement for the colouring agent Sunset Yellow, which is among a number of suspect food additives and also used in Lucozade. Instead, they opted to put a warning on the bottles:

'Sunset Yellow may have an adverse effect on activity and attention in children'.

Children again eh.

Déjà vu anyone?

Anyway, I  digress [slightly]… the Panorama programme, aired in the UK, isn’t available for view here in NZ so I downloaded it for my viewing pleasure.

The programme, ‘The Truth About Sports Products’, was aired on BBC TV July 19th and can be watched  here [UK only]

This latest exposure comes on the back of a $3 billion settlement fee to the US government which saw Glaxo plead guilty to a number of illegal promotional activities with prescription drugs. Their CEO, Andrew Witty, claimed [there's that word again] that it was all part of an era, suggesting that illegal promoting and falsifying data doesn't exist any more at Glaxo. Hmm, okay Andy, we believe you.

GSK were given the heads up of the BBC broadcast and released a pre-statement that was full of the usual denials, lines such as, "Lucozade Sport and the Maxinutrition range have become leading sports nutrition products and play a valued role in the active lives of millions of people in the UK." and "The evidence supporting the performance benefits of carbohydrate-electrolyte drinks such as Lucozade Sport is strong", and the classic, "We take our responsibilities to consumers very seriously..."


Oh well, at least they didn't blame an era.

Jofre, once again, highlighted Glaxo's desire to spin data - I doubt if she is on their Christmas card list... I doubt if she gives a hoot.





Fid

ORDER THE PAPERBACK 'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman US and CANADA HERE OR UK HERE

AUSTRALIAN ORDERS HERE



Thursday, November 03, 2011

Glaxo Fined $3 Billion!

GSK, fined $3 billion - The Olympic Committee must be so proud of them.
Image [Source]


The company that uses the promotional tagline of making it's consumers "do more, feel better, live longer" have agreed on a $ 3 billion settlement with the US government over the way they marketed their diabetes drug, Avandia.

Glaxo, as ethical as ever, were accused of paying its sales force teams hefty bonuses based on the number of prescriptions they generated, which ultimately may have led to doctors issuing prescriptions to patients for un-approved usage of nine of GlaxoSmithKline's drugs, including Paxil [Seroxat], Wellbutrin [Zyban]

The $3 billion fine, writes The Times, also brings to an end other investigations in the US into Glaxo’s marketing of the diabetes drug Avandia and the possible inappropriate use of the Medicaid Rebate Program.

Andrew Witty, Glaxo's CEO, is quoted in The Times article:


“This is a significant step toward resolving difficult, long-standing matters which do not reflect the company that we are today.

“In recent years, we have fundamentally changed our procedures for compliance, marketing and selling in the US to ensure that we operate with high standards of integrity and that we conduct our business openly and transparently.”


Meanwhile the UK Seroxat group action against GlaxoSmithKline which, despite rumours, is still on-going, sees Glaxo defend their antidepressant and the propensity it has to cause severe withdrawal problems in a number of patients. Glaxo, reflecting the way in which the company are today, are disputing that Seroxat has been problematic for the claimants in this case.

Regarding Avandia, it was withdrawn in Europe last year after it emerged that side effects included increased risk of heart attack. In the US it remains in place.

Now there's Openness and Transparency!



Fid

ORDER THE PAPERBACK 'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman US and CANADA HERE
OR UK FROM CHIPMUNKA PUBLISHING

AUSTRALIAN ORDERS HERE




Monday, September 05, 2011

The Genius Marketing of Glaxo's Facebook Squad



I have to take my hat off to the marketing team at GlaxoSmithKline. Never one to miss a trick in advertising by proxy sees their current Facebook page cover them in garlands with the post "Take a Swipe | Malaria No More UK – Ending Malaria Deaths" Their page, which can only be viewed if you use Facebook's "Like" button, can be accessed HERE

Whoever moderates Glaxo's page, be it a highly paid member of their marketing team or a student on an internship have deemed it fit to add the following comment to the 'Take a Sripe' post:


Take a swipe at malaria by buying GlaxoSmithKline products such as Lucozade, Ribena, Panadol and Beechams from participating Esso service stations during September 2011. For every GSK product purchased, 5p will be donated to Malaria No More UK.


Here's the thing about the first product of theirs they advertise - Lucozade


Back in July last year I reported on an article run by The Independent. Glaxo, along with A.Barr, manufacturers of every Scots persons favorite drink, Irn Bru, were forced warn parents that the drinks may cause hyperactivity.

Their second product advertised [by proxy] on their Facebook post is Ribena

Here's part of a story from an article that appeared in The Guardian in 2007.


Schoolgirls rumble Ribena vitamin claims

Two New Zealand schoolgirls humbled one of the world's biggest food and drugs companies after their school science experiment found that their ready-to-drink Ribena contained almost no trace of vitamin C.


Students Anna Devathasan and Jenny Suo tested the blackcurrant cordial against rival brands to test their hypothesis that cheaper brands were less healthy.


Instead, their tests found that the Ribena contained a tiny amount of vitamin C, while another brand's orange juice drink contained almost four times more.


"We thought we were doing it wrong. We thought we must have made a mistake," Anna told New Zealand's Weekend Herald. The girls were both 14 and students at Pakuranga College in Auckland when they did the experiment in 2004.


Given Ribena's advertising claims that "the blackcurrants in Ribena have four times the vitamin C of oranges"



So, Glaxo's concerted, or should that be conceited, effort to show what a caring company they are via Facebook seems a pretty decent exercise but, as usual, they aren't giving the consumer all the facts. I just thought I'd address the balance with this blog post of mine.

Incidently, I added a comment to the Glaxo Facebook post. It was a genuine question that, for the moment, has not been answered by the Glaxo Facebook moderator.

Click on image to enlarge


I'll keep you posted should they respond.





Fid 


ORDER THE PAPERBACK 'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman US and CANADA HERE OR UK FROM CHIPMUNKA PUBLISHING 


AUSTRALIAN ORDERS HERE



Sunday, June 26, 2011

Glaxo Warned in 1994 About their "False & Misleading" Information on Paxil/Seroxat



Another gem of a file from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), who recently uploaded a total of 296 documents to the DIDA Library.

This particular document shows how, in 1994, GlaxoSmithKline were warned by The Department of Health & Human Sciences [DOHHS] about their promotion of Paxil [known in the UK as Seroxat]

The complete 12 page letter, which can be downloaded here, shows how the DOHHS sent Glaxo a warning letter pointing out that their promotion of Paxil carried many false and misleading claims.

Here's a few tasters:

7. "A low discontinuation rate" chart. (PX1004, pg. 16)
This chart presents the two most common reasons for discontinuation in the clinical trials, suggesting that the sum of these rates, 5-7%, provide an estimate of the overall rate of discontinuation. Because the actual overall rate of discontinuation due to adverse events is much higher, 21%, this suggestion is false and/or misleading.


8. Failure to provide fair balance.
Pages 16 and 17 of PX1004 are incorporated into a fold-out page layout design. These pages discuss the warnings and adverse events associated with Paxil therapy. However, unless the viewer is actively searching for this important risk information, it is unlikely that SKB's sales representatives will call attention to this disclosure. Moreover, since the brochure is a detail aid for sales representatives use and is not left behind for the healthcare provider, this likelihood is further diminished. The presentation of risk information is completely inadequate and is false and/or misleading.


11. "Proven safe and effective in long-term treatment and relapse prevention." (PX1634, pg. 16)
This claim and accompanying graph are derived from the study by Duboff et al. entitled, "Long Term Treatment of major depressive disorder with paroxetine." This study consists of a one year, multicenter, open-label study involving 433 patients with ma^or depressive disorder followed by a long-term extension study including 110 of the patients. As discussed in Comment 1, the lack of a placebo control arm renders the efficacy resultsuninterpretable. Therefore, this study is inadequate to support this claim, and this claim is false and/or misleading.


14. "'Like many other antidepressants, common side effects..." (PX1604)
The phrase, "like many other," minimizes the importance of the side effects associated with Paxil therapy. Therefore, this statement is false and/or misleading.


There are 18 in all, all of which can be viewed HERE


ARE YOU STRUGGLING TO WITHDRAW FROM SEROXAT/PAXIL?

Email Glaxo and tell them. Chances are, you will be referred back to your doctor, if so, email me.

Email GSK Customer Relations HERE

Related articles:

How Glaxo Wanted to Turn the Issue of Withdrawal in Their Favour

Previously Unseen Paxil GlaxoSmithKline Court Documents Part I


Fid


ORDER THE PAPERBACK
'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman
US & CANADA HERE OR UK FROM CHIPMUNKA PUBLISHING

AUSTRALIAN ORDERS HERE 
 

Friday, March 05, 2010

NO GUTS, NO GLORY - AIRBOURNE


Image: roadrunnerrecords.co.uk

Totally unrelated post today folks. Sometimes writing about GlaxoSmithKline, the MHRA and Seroxat, leaves a bitter taste in the mouth. Thankfully, there is music in my life to take away such bile. Today I want to promote a band that not many of my readers will have heard of, not many will like them, particularly if loud rock isn't your 'thang'.


I remember when I first heard this band, kinda blew my socks off as AC/DC hadn't released an album or even toured in years.

Back then, as a myspace user, I joined the 'Airbourne' group page, it had about 24 members, today it has over 48,000.

I've been to see them twice in my home town and even reviewed their debut studio album, 'Runnin Wild'

It was ballbustin' pub rock at its best and time to clear off the cobwebs of the air guitar.

Airbourne will be releasing their second studio effort later this month. No Guts, No Glory is available to stream online at Road Runner Records. My first impressions? It rocks. It will take a few plays before I can review it.

If you are a fan of straight laced rock n' roll with guitars turned to eleven and vocals turned to twelve then you may just enjoy Airbourne's new offering.

You can listen to the whole album HERE

Fid

ORDER THE PAPERBACK
'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman
SIGNED COPIES HERE OR UNSIGNED FROM CHIPMUNKA PUBLISHING

Wednesday, March 03, 2010

Ghostbusting in Paxil Birth Defect Litigation

Part 5 of Evie Pringle's exposé on GlaxoSmithKline

Other parts in this series:

Paxil Birth Defect Litigation - First Trial A Bust For Glaxo

Paxil Birth Defect Trial - Battle of the Experts

Glaxo Birth Defect Litigation Reveals Paxil Promoters on Speed Dial

Cold Case Files - Paxil Birth Defects

Evelyn has kindly given me permission to reproduce all of this series in its entirety.


Image: pics.blameitonthevoices.com


Ghostbusting in Paxil Birth Defect Litigation

A month before the first Paxil birth defect trial against GlaxoSmithKline was set to begin, the Associated Press ran the headline, "Glaxo Used Ghostwriting Program to Promote Paxil," in reporting on a program called "CASPPER," which allowed doctors to "take credit for medical journal articles mainly written by company consultants."


"Drug companies frequently hire outside firms to draft a manuscript touting a company's drug, retain a physician to sign off as the author and then find a publisher to unwittingly publish the work," the Associated Press said on August 19, 2009. "Drug company salespeople often present medical journal articles to physicians as independent proof that their drugs are safe and effective."

Between 2000 and 2002, articles from the CASPPER program appeared in five medical journals. On August 21, 2009, Jim Edwards on BNET, described the CASSPER ghostwriting brochure. The document shows that the intent of CASSPER was to flood the market with ghostwritten information, he said. It stated: "Paxil Product Management has budgeted for 50 articles for 2000."


The trial in Kilker v Glaxo ended on October 13, 2009, with a jury in Philadelphia finding that Glaxo "negligently failed to warn" the doctor treating Lyam Kilker's mother about Paxil's risks and the drug was a "factual cause" of Lyam's heart defects. The family was award $2.5 million.

Ghostwriting 101

The world-renowned neuropsychopharmacologist from the UK, Dr David Healy, testified as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in the Kilker trial.

While testifying, Healy explained the process of ghostwriting to the jury. He said ghostwriting probably began seriously in the 1980s. "It's where an article appears under the name of usually a fairly distinguished person in the field," he testified.

But it involves more than just the true author being concealed, he told the jury. "It's a process where the ghostwriters work for companies who are very good at getting articles into the best journals in the field, like the New England Journal of Medicine, and recruiting some of the best known names in the field to be the apparent authors of the articles."

"They may come from one of the big named universities like Princeton or whoever, but the actual fact the person who appears to be the author isn't the true author," he said. "If you were to read the article, you often don't get any hints of who the true author of the article actually was."

Ghostwriting impacts doctors in the real world trying to make decisions on whether to prescribe a drug in several ways, Healy told the jury. For instance, he said, if he was doing his own writing, he "would write an article on the drug, warts and all."

"But if the article has been written by a ghostwriter working for one of the pharmaceutical companies," he said, "the chances are the warts are somehow going to vanish."

"The article will talk about the good aspects of the drug and will leave out the risky issues which are probably the most important things for the practicing doctor to know," he explained.

If the ghost author comes from an extremely distinguished university, doctors reading the article will think it has to be right, he said. "The simple fact that the article is going to be apparently written by this big named person and appears in an extremely good journal means that most average doctors will think this has to be true," he told the jury.

It's not just the case of the doctor who reads the article being deceived, he said. "It's the fact that the credibility of the institution is and the name is being used to sell the drug, as well."

Healy came face-to-face with ghostwriting when one of the drug companies offered to ghostwrite his articles, he said. Since then, he has researched the ghostwriting process to assess how common it is.

The assessment found that "at least half, maybe more, of the articles that appear in major journals under the names of the best known people in the field, are ghostwritten when they have to do with pharmaceutical drugs," he told the jury.

"If they have to do with the drugs that are being sold at the moment, the ones that are fashionable at the moment, then these articles are highly likely to be ghostwritten even when they appear in the very best journals," Healy said.

Ghostwriting Up Close

While testifying, Healy told the jury that he was familiar with companies that Glaxo hired to ghostwrite literature and put other doctors' names on it. "I think the leading firm in the field was one called STI," he said. "This stands for Scientific Therapeutics Information."

The jury was shown a July 28, 2003, document sent to the Glaxo product manager for Paxil, by Sally Laden, working for STI, which stated: "Thank you for offering me the chance to work with you to write two review articles."


"This letter summarizes my fees for this project," Laden wrote. "The safety paper is priced higher because of a greater number of named authors and the anticipated additional work involved in assessing the CR data in progress."


For the development of the manuscript, and up to five drafts, the price quoted was $12,000. One of the topics for a manuscript was on the safety of antidepressants in breast-feeding.


"The first draft will be the first run through the material," Healy told the jury. "She will have put the article together laying out the issues, laying out the references, structuring the paper up in the way that the journal she actually expects that this paper is going to go to will want the article structured."


Draft 2 goes back to Glaxo again and the author, whoever is actually going to put their name on the paper. Then draft 3 goes back to Glaxo and the author for sign-off, and then there will be a final version that goes to the journal, Healy explained. Then draft 5 is revisions from journal reviewers, he said.

He noted that Laden said the safety paper is more expensive because there was going to be more authors. "I should emphasize that more authors here does not mean more authors writing the paper," Healy told the jury. "It means more names appearing on the authorship line."


"She has to recruit people and the people whose names are on the authorship line get paid for being authors," he explained.


Sally Laden's "name has appeared on a range of different articles that have been produced for GlaxoSmithKline, not just on the issue of giving drugs to women of childbearing years but across the board," Healy said.


During Healy's testimony, the family's lead attorney from Houston, Sean Tracey, introduced the actual manuscript by STI. "This is an article that is going to go to a journal," Healy said. "It has been authored by Ms. Laden, contrary to what appears there."

The names Zachary Stowe and Jeffrey Newport appeared on the authorship line. Healy noted that Draft 4 stated: "Final article cover page to be removed."

"The cover page will be removed," he explained, "because the journal will treat the article quite differently if they think that the true author is not on the authorship line."

Healy said the paper was an example of ghostwriting. "It is going to go to a journal called Psychopharmacology Bulletin," he testified. "And in this particular issue of the journal where this paper later comes out, every paper in that issue of the journal has to do with Paxil."

The jury was then shown the actual article that was published and it was the exact same article but without Laden's name on it.

Healy testified that Stowe runs the women's mental health program at Emory University and publishes on SSRIs and women's health issues, with publications favorable to Paxil, and also gives seminars and talks for other doctors which outline "how it can be a good thing to treat women of childbearing years with Paxil."

He was not allowed to tell the jury how much Glaxo had paid Stowe over the last year or two, which was revealed by an investigation led by Iowa Senator, Charles Grassley, as the ranking Republican on the US Senate Finance Committee. The amount Stowe got paid "is not public knowledge where you can show me a document that says it," the judge said.

However, Stowe's Glaxo earnings are most certainly public knowledge. A google search in December 2009, with the following three key words in quotes, "Stowe" "GSK" "paid," brought up 15,800 hits.

On June 10, 2009, in reference to Stowe, the Wall Street Journal reported, "Emory University has disciplined a prominent psychiatrist who was being paid by an antidepressant maker at the same time he was conducting federal research about the use of such drugs in pregnant women."

The National Institute of Mental Health said "it is reviewing Stowe's activities, prompted by a letter from a U.S. Senate committee that said Stowe received $253,700 in 2007 and 2008 for "essentially promotional talks" for the drug maker GlaxoSmithKline," the June 11, 2009 Atlanta Journal- Constitution reported.


The charts with dates for Stowe's promotional talks reveal that many times he gave two talks for Glaxo on the same date and made five grand per day, in addition to payment for all traveling expenses. On one date, he billed $96 for meals alone.


For ready reference, the list of academics in the field of psychiatry identified by Grassley's investigation thus far, as not fully disclosing money from drug companies, includes Joseph Biederman, Thomas Spencer and Timothy Wilens at Harvard, Charles Nemeroff and Zackery Stowe from Emory; Melissa DelBello at the University of Cincinnati; Alan Schatzberg, president of the American Psychiatric Association, from Stanford; Martin Keller at Brown University; Karen Wagner and A John Rush from the University of Texas; and Fred Goodwin, the former host of the radio show, "Infinite Minds," broadcast for years by National Pubic Radio, before it was thrown off the air.



The supplement to the Spring 2003, "Psychopharmacology Bulletin," found online, sure enough shows the ghostwritten paper, "Clinical Management of Perinatal Depression: Focus on Paroxetine," with the names Stowe and Newport, along with papers by Martin Kelly, Charles Nemeroff, Alan Schatzberg, Karen Wagner, and Kim Yonkers, for a total of fourteen Paxil papers altogether.

Under "Disclosure," the article ghostwritten by Laden stated: "This work was supported by an unrestricted educational grant from GlaxoSmithKline. Doctor Stowe serves as scientific advisor for and receives research grants from Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline. He also receives grant support from Wyeth."

The disclosure that the work was supported with a grant from Glaxo would not tell a doctor reading the paper that it was actually written by somebody else, Healy said.

While testifying, Healy explained that an "unrestricted educational grant, if I were to receive one, it would assume that I am saying things that are relatively favorable to the pharmaceutical company who has given me the educational grant."


"If I am saying things hostile to the drug," he said, "I will not get an unrestricted educational grant, although the word "unrestricted" suggests that I should."


Stowe's undisclosed income above was from Glaxo alone. In August 2007, he was listed as an author on a study titled, "Atypical Antipsychotic Administration During Late Pregnancy," in the American Journal of Psychiatry.

According to the disclosure section, Stowe has received research support from Glaxo, Pfizer, and Wyeth, has served on advisory boards for Glaxo, Wyeth, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, and has served on speaker's bureaus and/or received honoraria from Glaxo, Lilly, Pfizer, and Wyeth.

The second author on the ghostwritten paper, Jeffrey Newport, is the associate director of Emory's Women's Program. Newport was also an author on the "Atypical Antipsychotic" study. He has received research support from Glaxo, Lilly, Janssen, the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression, NIH, and Wyeth, and, he has served on speaker's bureaus for Glaxo, AstraZeneca, Lilly, Pfizer, and Wyeth, according to the disclosures.



The next person the jury heard about was Charles Nemeroff. He was also an author on the atypical study. Nemeroff was the Chief of Psychiatry at Emory, until he lost the position last year, Healy told the jury. "He's possibly best known or was the best known psychiatrist in the United States."


"He influenced an awful lot of heads of departments, professors of psychiatry, general people within the field of academic mental health, and through them and an awful lot of prescribing doctors here in the U.S. And, indeed, perhaps worldwide," Healy testified.

A link to "Articles" on the Emory website in mid-2009, brought up roughly 90 studies and papers that include the co-author Nemeroff.

Healy said he believed Nemeroff was one of the founding members of the Paxil advisory board and he participated in continuing medical education seminars with talks on Paxil.

Nemeroff would have been "the key person in producing the kinds of talks with slides that would have been held for large audiences of doctors, and then those slides and talks would have been distributed out to different doctors in the field who hadn't been at the major meetings as he gave his talk," Healy told the jury.

During his testimony, Tracey showed Healy a document from a continuing medical education seminar titled, "Fertility, Mood and Motherhood," and Healy said the material for the seminar was prepared by Glaxo for Nemeroff. It was again supported by unrestricted educational grant from Glaxo and Nemeroff "was reimbursed for his role in this," Healy pointed out.

Healy was also not allowed to testify about Nemeroff's fall from grace at Emory, how much he was paid by Glaxo, or his failure to disclose over a million dollars from drug companies.

Dr Bernard Carroll, a past chairman of the department of psychiatry at Duke University Medical Center, summarized the Nemeroff saga well on the Healthcare Renewal website on November 3, 2008, in writing: "The fallout to date includes his severance from several NIH-funded projects at Emory University School of Medicine, a freeze of NIH funding for a major center grant, and his stepping down from Emory's chair of psychiatry while an internal investigation proceeds."

During her cross examination of Healy, Glaxo's lead attorney, Chilton Varner, presented an exhibit showing a continuing medical education presentation given by Nemeroff.

"Can you see that in this continuing medical education program Doctor Nemeroff says that paroxetine, sertraline, fluvoxamine, (are) not associated with increased risk of teratogenicity or other complications?" she asked Healy.

"Yes, I do," he replied.

In small print, the disclosure for the presentation showed Nemeroff had received research grants and participated in the speakers bureau and consulted for Glaxo, Eli Lilly, Solvay and Pfizer.

During re-direct, Tracey asked Healy to tell the jury what the actual results of the study that Nemeroff was discussing in the presentation showed, and specifically when Paxil was looked at alone. The results "showed that there was a 1.8-fold increase in the odds ratio of a birth defects to the women who have been taking Paxil during pregnancy," Healy testified.

"Overall, for this group of drugs there was an increase in risk," he said, "but specifically for Paxil the risk was greatly increased."

"And beyond that," Healy stated, "what isn't included here in the conclusions, overall there was a -- on this group of drugs, there was a doubling of the rate of miscarriages on the drug compared with the rate of miscarriage for the women who are being compared who weren't on the drug."

"There was also an increased rate of women going on to voluntarily abortions on the drug," he added.

One of the lead authors on the study was Gideon Koren. "Doctor, without giving any details," Tracey asked Healy, "do you know whether Doctor Koren has ties to the pharmaceutical industry?"

"I know he has," Healy said.

During his opening statement, Tracey told the jury that 1998 was a big year for Paxil because a study came out by a doctor named Gideon Koren, and a researcher named Kulin, that looked at Paxil and two other SSRIs.

The study compared women who took SSRIs, to women who didn't take any SSRIs, and the number of birth defects in the two groups was the same. "So Doctor Koren concluded that SSRIs appear to be safe," Tracey said.

"Within, literally within 24 hours," he told the jury, "GSK's marketing machine cranked up and they faxed this information to their entire sales force."

And the sales force took this information and began to use it to sell to women, he noted. "What they didn't tell anybody was this," Tracey said. "That when you separated Paxil out from the other SSRIs, you saw that Paxil was causing birth defects, that there was an increased risk of birth defects in this study in these women when you looked at Paxil by itself."

"That was not in the paper," he said. "That information was not found out until two years ago."

While testifying, Healy was barred from telling the jury about Koren's involvement in one the biggest academic research scandals in history a few years back when he sent vicious anonymous letters to discredit fellow researchers and denied doing so until DNA evidence from postage stamps proved he was lying years later. In September 2003, the Canadian Association of University Teachers reported on the disciplining of Koren in the CAUT Bulletin as follows:

"The Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons has formally reprimanded University of Toronto professor of medicine Dr. Gideon Koren. He had written anonymous harassing letters about Dr. Nancy

Olivieri and three colleagues during Olivieri's dispute with the Hospital for Sick Children, the University of Toronto and Apotex Inc. He then had lied repeatedly to conceal his responsibility. The college also cited him for additional misconduct, in research."

The Teachers Association further explained in the Bulletin: "The college's finding of research misconduct was in relation to a study on a drug to treat a blood disorder in children that Koren and Olivieri had once collaborated on. Olivieri identified risks that the drug was ineffective and caused liver damage, and voiced her concerns despite legal warnings from its maker, Apotex. Koren differed and, contrary to accepted norms, published an article on the drug using data from other researchers, including Olivieri, without their knowledge or consent."

"Koren had received hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding from Apotex after the company had terminated the drug trials in its efforts to prevent Olivieri from disclosing risks to patients, as well as the hundreds of thousands of dollars in funding he had received during the trials," the newsletter reported, citing an journal article by the authors of "The Olivieri Report."

Apotex marketed a generic version of Paxil, or paroxetine.



The penalty had been jointly proposed to the discipline committee through prior agreement between Koren's attorney and counsel for the college, the Bulletin noted. In its decision, the committee said it was "deeply troubled by this case" and "seriously considered administering a more severe penalty" than that proposed, as it wished "to express unequivocally its condemnation of Dr. Koren's misconduct."

Glaxo Money Still Flowing


In a December 14, 2009 report on Pharmalot, Ed Silverman noted that Glaxo had published a list of fees paid out to US healthcare professionals for speaking and consulting services for the three month period of April 1, 2009 to June 30, 2009. "By its own tally, Glaxo paid $14.6 million to approximately 3,700 US docs and other healthcare professionals," he reported.


Although Glaxo paid out millions of dollars over the years to the doctors discussed in this article, not one of them was called to testify as an expert in the first birth defect trial.


Evelyn Pringle

(The Paxil Birth Defect Litigation Update Series is sponsored by the Houston law firm of Vickery, Waldner and Mallia at www.justiceseekers.com )

(Evelyn Pringle is an investigative Journalist and Researcher focused on exposing corruption in government and corporate America)



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'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman
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GOUT


Image: beliefnet.com


Bloody gout has reared its ugly head again. Same place, my big toe on my right foot.

I think we take our feet for granted. This morning I struggled to put a sock on so I could take my cross Rhodesian Ridgeback/Boxer out for his morning walk.

I've tried retracing my steps [pardon the pun] to try and ascertain what has caused this painful ailment to return. I know it's excess acid but I can't fathom out what I have ate or drank that's been any different to my normal way of living.

Cheaper coffee perhaps? My Nescafe granules went out the window a while ago and I now budget for the cheap ['Supermarket's own] brand.

Eating too much gravy [granules] - Yes, believe it or not, gravy granules can bring on an attack of gout!

Too much alcohol? Hardly - I can barely afford a bottle of cheap [Supermarket's own] orange squash, let alone booze - although my dad does come to see me once a fortnight and always brings me some Red Stripe lager.

Just as well I haven't got gout in my fingers as typing this post would be a struggle.

For those of you that have experienced gout in the toe/s you will know that it's basically crystals that form in the joint/s - close-up these crystals look like shards of glass - trust me, they bloody well feel like it too!

So, plenty of water and my leg in the 12 O'Clock position seems the order of the day and my poor old dog, Benn, will have to wait an hour or so before I'm able to put on my sock [ouch] then shoe [double ouch]

All I need now is the likes of Shania Twain knocking on my door asking me if I want to mattress dance!

Tips and avoidances would be appreciated folks.

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Tuesday, March 02, 2010

CHARLIE NEMEROFF WRITES...TO HIMSELF!

How bizarre.

This publicly available document sees Charles Nemeroff draft a letter to himself, it appears he is inviting himself to submit an article for the special supplement edition of Depression and Anxiety.

You will note that he is telling himself that the 'article' be no more than twelve printed pages in length including references, figures and tables.

Even more bizarre, Nemeroff writes:

"We shall provide you with an honorarium of $3,000 for this effort."

Either Nemeroff was suffering a form of dementia or he was merely writing a ghost-written letter for someone to add their name to and to send to him?

How bizarre Charlie!

Here's the letter.

CLICK ON IMAGE


Full letter can be downloaded HERE

For a brief history on Charles Nemeroff, read Evie Pringle's excellent article, 'SSRI Pushers Under Fire'

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Monday, March 01, 2010

MY FIRST BOOK REVIEW


Image: uiwp.uiuc.edu

Many thanks to Susan at 'If Your'e Going Through Hell Keep Going' blog for, firstly, purchasing a copy of my e-book, and secondly for writing such a great review.

The paperback will be out before the year ends.

Fid

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'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman
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Cold Case Files - Paxil Birth Defects


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Part Four of Evelyn Pringle's Paxil Birth Defect Articles

Other parts

PART 1, 2, 3

REPRODUCED WITH THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF EVELYN PRINGLE




Cold Case Files - Paxil Birth Defects

Almost like an episode of the TV show, Cold Case Files, the first Paxil birth defect trial was dominated by a story about what happened to the rat pups that died around 1979 and1980, involved in a study in which Paxil was being tested on pregnant female rats.

The animal studies giving Paxil to rats and rabbits were conducted by a Danish company called Ferrosan before the drug maker, that later became part of GlaxoSmithKline, purchased the drug.

The family's lead attorney in the case of Kilker v Glaxo, Sean Tracey from Houston, brought in the world-famous neuropsychopharmocology expert from Wales, Dr David Healy, to testify extensively about rat pup study 295.

In summary, Healy told the jury that all the rat pups born to mothers who received Paxil were dead four days after they were born, while eighty-eight percent of the pups not exposed to Paxil were still alive on day four.

In fact, of the 415 rat pups born to mothers who received Paxil, Healy testified that, "One in every ten or actually maybe more like possibly one in every eight or so were born dead."

As far as he could make make out, all the rats were not autopsied, Healy said, so the question was why the pups died.

"It's clearly the drug that has caused the death," he told the jury.

"One of the possible reasons for their death is they're born with birth defects that lead to them actually dying early in infant life," he testified. "A responsible approach to data like this is to investigate it further and find out just what the cause is."

Doctor Suzanne Parisian, a former FDA scientist, also served as an expert for the plaintiffs. She testified that the first safety signals that indicated Paxil could cause birth defects were seen in the animal studies conducted in 1979-1981 period, as well.

Parisian said the studies showed birth defects, embryos that died, and rat pups that did not survive.

Adam Peavy, of the Houston firm of Bailey, Perrin and Bailey, handled her testimony. While testifying, Peavy had Parisian review comments in a memo by a Doctor John Baldwin to Glaxo in 1980, discussing the Ferrosan studies, which stated: "There remains the possibility that this compound could be teratogenic at high-dose levels."

"We need to ascertain whether Ferrosan have conducted or are conducting or intend to conduct a peri- and postnatal study and a neonatal acute toxicity study," Baldwin wrote.

Based on her review the documents, Parisian told the jury, Glaxo never ascertained whether Ferrosan did the studies and Glaxo never conducted the studies.

As far as she knew, the company never told the FDA about Baldwin's statements either, she said, but "they should have."

On October 13, 2009, the jury in Philadelphia rendered a verdict against Glaxo and awarded the family $2.5 million. More than 600 Paxil birth defect cases are pending in the multi-litigation in Pennsylvania.

Paxil Worse Than Cocaine

In May 2009, a paper was published by a Doctor Sloot and the complete version of the study came out in September 2009. During closing arguments, Tracey told the jury, the "Sloot study is probably the single most problematic document in this case for them because it could have easily been done."

"They would have known that the drug was a clear teratogen. It was more powerful than cocaine," he said. "And it was more powerful a teratogen than even the control or as powerful as the control retinol that everybody in this courtroom, everybody that has testified, has said that drug is a teratogen."

"And had GSK done the studies that Baldwin told them they should do, or a study like Sloot, any time before they started marketing," he told the jury, "we wouldn't be here."

Retinol is an active ingredient in Accutane, a pregnancy Category X drug, meaning it is known to cause birth defects and is not to be used by pregnant women.

During his testimony, Healy was asked to tell the jury what the Sloot study was seeking to do.

"Schering-Plough had acquired a different European company called Organon who had a number of drugs which were serotonin reuptake inhibiting drugs,"he explained.

"One of the things that Schering-Plough wished to find out was could they bring any of these drugs to the market," he said.

"What they then did was to do reproductive toxicology studies on these drugs that were new to them, plus on, I believe, all of the SSRI drugs that were on the market, plus a number of drugs which also inhibit serotonin reuptake, like cocaine, and they threw into the mix one or two more drugs, one that was known not to cause birth defects and one that was known to cause birth defects closely related to Accutane," he told the jury.

They had a "particular system to look at the impact of all these drugs on the developing fetus to see were there any indicators of risk," he said, using rat fetuses.

The study "found that Paxil, of all the SSRIs on the market now, was the most likely to cause birth defects and caused birth defects at the same rate as Accutane did," Healy said.

He was asked how Paxil did in the study compared to cocaine in terms of potency.

"It was much more likely to cause birth defects than cocaine," he said. "Cocaine in this particular system was much safer than Paxil."

On September 21, 2009, the jury also heard testimony on the Sloot study from Doctor Shira Kramer, an epidemiologist. "Doctor Sloot's paper demonstrated that Paxil was a clear teratogen," she said, "that it was not just an effect of developmental or birth-weight related effect, that it was a direct teratogen, and that there was a spectrum of defects observed in rat embryos at low doses, establishing that it was a very potent teratogen, more teratogenic than cocaine and retinol, clear teratogens in their own right."

Parisian told the jury that the Sloot study, conducted in 2009, could have been conducted in 1981 and it would have answered the question that Dr Baldwin was asking about embryotoxicity in 1980.

"If you use that type of a study, it specifically addresses embryotoxicity," she told the jury.

Paxil Journey to Japan

Although Paxil was not approved in Japan until 2000, a couple years after it was approved in the US in 1992, Glaxo began looking into marketing the drug in Japan and meeting the requirements for approval by the Minister of Health and Welfare (MHW), the Japanese equivalent to the FDA.

"And the Japanese, they suspected, were not going to accept their dead rat pup studies," Tracey told the jury in his opening statement on September 15, 2009.

"And so GSK began discussions internally," he said. "Internally among themselves they said: What are we ... going to do if Japan makes us do the studies to find out why the rat pups died?"

While Healy was testifying, Tracey introduced a February 9, 1994 memo to Glaxo employee Charlie Fake, and copied to others, from Jenny Greenhorn titled, "Paroxetine Japanese reprotox requirements," and asked Healy to explain the meaning of "reprotox."

Any "agency in the world has a requirement from the pharmaceutical companies to look at the reproductive toxicities of a drug," Healy said. "This includes the impact of the drug on fertility, as well as the potential for the drug to cause birth defects."

The first sentence of the memo stated, "we have reviewed the three plans for meeting the Japanese reprotox requirements for their regulatory implications elsewhere, should a valid, significant positive i.e., adverse, result be obtained."

The next two sentences in the memo stated: "The conclusions reached within regulatory are summarized below."

"It should be noted that there is little or no regulatory information in this area, and we know of no precedents, neither have we consulted with experts outside of the company due to sensitivity of the issue," they wrote.

"These are, therefore, only our opinions of the likely consequences of positive findings in such studies," they pointed out.

"What you want from this kind of study is that there is no harm to the fetus," Healy explained to the jury.

"A positive outcome means there has been a harm," he said. "So they're here trying to plan if things go wrong, how do we handle it."

Healy testified that, "regulatory implications elsewhere," refers to the fact that the market in Japan is extremely small and the market in the US is huge. "They really have to work out if it is a worthwhile risk being asked to do particular studies which might cause a problem which we would then have to report back to the FDA," he said.

"And the implications for the market here in the U.S. may mean that it's just not worth our while trying to go to Japan at all," Healy testified.

Indeed, throughout page one they discussed the "consequences" of positive findings in the plans for "such studies" if done for Japan. For instance, they stated at one point: "A change in the pregnancy category from B to C is a possibility."

"This may have commercial implications as the other SSRIs have a B categorization," they pointed out.

After reviewing the first page and explaining several statements to the jury, Healy was asked whether it appeared that anybody had considered the safety of Paxil. "It appears to me actually as a scientist that this is the opposite to what one would do," he said, "if the point of view from the scientific end of things is we want to find out what happens."

What "seems to be happening here is there is a much more business approach which is, well, we don't really want to know what happens," he said. "Because if we know, then there are commercial implications."

For Plan II, they also discussed the "problem" and stated: "A positive finding in the Japanese style Segment II study would be more of a problem since in this case it is undoubtedly exposure during early pregnancy that is of concern for women."

"A strengthening of the labeling might be likely, EG, women of childbearing potential should not take the drug unless they know they are not pregnant and are taking adequate contraceptive precautions," they warned. "Worst case, but just possible, contraindication of women of childbearing potential."

"What they're saying here is that an awful lot of women clearly don't know they're actually pregnant until a few weeks into the pregnancy," Healy had explained earlier, regarding what was meant by "contraindication" for women in childbearing years.

"Those early few weeks are the period when the harms may happen," he said. "And in the case of a drug like this where ... there may be a risk of being hooked to the drugs so you cannot get off it if you think you may have become pregnant, then clearly this all becomes extremely risky as it goes on."

And in this paragraph, they reiterated: "Again, a change in U.S. Pregnancy category from B to C is likely."

"A positive in the Japanese Segment III would be less of a problem," they wrote, "since it defines the critical period as the third trimester which authorities would feel more comfortable with."

"However," they warned, "they may insist on animal findings being added to the labeling with additional comments and this is certainly the case with the United States, Canada and Australia who have extensive product information."

In the last paragraph for Plan III, they stated: "This is the same as Plan I, but the lower doses make findings much less likely."

Again, "this looks like risk management," Healy told the jury.

"What seems to be happening here," he said, "is an effort to design a particular kind of experiment that would look like we have been doing things but we're trying to control the risks, things that could go wrong."

"So that people will say, well, yes, they have done the experiments, but it didn't show a particular problem," he told the jury.

Later in the memo, they stated: "Obviously, conducting no more studies and arguing the case with the MHW would have no regulatory implications elsewhere unless our arguments fail and the MHW requests us to do the type of study we wish to avoid."

And then it went on to warn: "If they do request a study, there's a potential problem in that they may direct/insist on our performing a study to their preferred design."

"At least we are now in the position of being able to do the study we chose and then defending it," they wrote, with an exclamation point.

After having Healy discuss what was meant by comments throughout the memo, Tracey asked: "Is there anything in this entire document you see, Dr. Healy, that appears as if there is a study being designed by this company to find out the truth about their drug in pregnancy?"

"No, there isn't," Healy replied.

While Parisian was testifying, the jury was shown an email dated March 30, 1994, with a discussion about the Japanese government asking for specific information about behavioral changes in babies exposed to Paxil and the protocols for a study that was being designed to respond.

The last sentence read to the jury stated: "Gwyn Morgan will be responsible for the review and the analysis of the protocols to ensure that a likelihood of any potential negative outcome is minimized."

The goal of pharmacovigilance is not to minimize risk, "particularly when the Japanese government is concerned about the risk," Parisian told the jury.

The purpose of doing pharmacovigilance and safety surveillance, in terms of
toxicology, she said, "is to identify risks so that it can be addressed."

"And in terms of pharmacovigilance, animal study feeds into the information you have about outcomes of infants," she told the jury.

In 1997, Glaxo teratologist, Patrick Wier, conducted the rat study, with Segment one comparable to women in the first trimester of pregnancy, and Segments Two and Three comparable to women in the second and third trimesters.

Each "type of study in a rat is trying to simulate what would occur in a woman at those different stages," Parisian explained to the jury.

Rats are only pregnant for about 22 days, or 7 to 8 days per trimester, she said.

Wier's study was not designed to find out whether Paxil was a teratogen. It was a behavioral study, "which the ultimate goal was to keep pups alive so that you could look at changes in their behavior," she pointed out.

"They designed the study to fail," Tracey told the jury in his opening statement.

A 1997 document stated the doses "have been adjusted accordingly and the risk is now considered as minimal and acceptable," he said in closing arguments.

But the study did have rats that died with birth defects. Specifically, a ventricular septal defect (VSD), was found in an edematous (swollen) rat; one of the same defects that Lyam Kilker was born with.

The conclusions in the report did not disclose whether the rat with VSD was born to a mother exposed to Paxil. "It was in the text and it was also in appendix 9," Parisian said.

She testified that the 1980 Ferrosan study also had two edematous rats but they were not autopsied. There is "no information as to why those two rats were edematous," she stated, "but the company listed them as major malformations."

"They also had malformations in their rabbit studies," Parisian reported.

Testimony Debunked

In closing arguments, Tracey pointed out that Patrick Wier had testified that he knew why the rats died because he did a study in 1997.

"Let's see whether or not that's true," he told the jury.

He then reread a memo, gone over during the trial, from July 10, 1998, a year after Wier did his study, which stated in reference to Wier: "Have you worked with Patrick on the concern about the REPROTOX work having been conducted in the seventies? If no, please initiate discussions and set up plans for the MHW discussion. If yes, I would like to know how we intend to justify the validity of these studies and the arguments for rebutting why we should not repeat them."

"I don't know how I can take that out of context," Tracey told the jury.

"If they knew the reason," he asked, "why do they need to defend or justify the validity of the studies?"

"Why do they have to have an argument for not repeating them if they are fine and ... everybody knows why the rats died?," he pointed out.

He noted that Wier's memo said, "all we really need is a plausible explanation in case the regulators ask us why the rats died."

One thing is undisputed in this case, Tracey said. "They never did the test at the higher level with the rabbit to figure out whether or not this drug was a teratogen."

"If what a drug company really wants to know is whether or not their drug is dangerous, they test it. They don't avoid tests," he told the jury in closing arguments.

"Because the negative result will cost us money is not a defense to not finding out the truth about your drug," he pointed out.

Secret Reports

During her testimony, Parisian explained that once a drug is approved it is the manufacturer's job to do pharmacovigilance.

The clinical trials done to get a new drug approved typically do not have women that are pregnant, she testified. Once a drug is marketed, the company will start getting data about mothers who are pregnant and their babies and it's "the duty of the manufacturer to monitor that," she said.

In the case of Paxil, the trials excluded both women who were pregnant and women who could become pregnant because the animal date suggested that there was a risk, she noted, citing a 1984 FDA letter.

While testifying, Peavy had Parisian review a 1997 internal Glaxo document titled, "Paroxetine: Pregnancy with Abnormal Outcomes," discussing the reporting of birth defects in Japan.

The document stated in part: "There have been 17 reports of congenital abnormality reports to the MHW."

It also stated: "The company should consider it important that this many cases have appeared."

The document contained a table with a list of adverse event reports collected on birth defects and birth outcomes, based on an internal review of information received about pregnancies, that showed 32 reports of abnormal outcomes with congenital anomalies.

The company had information on a total of 635 pregnancies in general but only knew the outcomes for 315 infants. "So about half they don't know what happened," Parisian explained.

You don't "know what has happened to those babies at all," she stated.

Parisian testified that Glaxo internally had reports that looked at all birth defects known to the company, which she had reviewed prior to the trial.

One of the reports was titled, "Paroxetine in Pregnancy," on adverse events and pregnancy outcomes.

This analysis had a cutoff date of May 1996, and would include the knowledge of the company on pregnancies from the date Paxil was approved in 1992, through May of 1996, Parisian said. The table in this report showed 36 cases of abnormal or congenital outcomes.

This report was never submitted to the FDA according to the testimony of Glaxo employees, Parisian said, but it should have been because it "is safety information."

In 1998, Glaxo prepared another internal report titled, "Paroxetine and Reports of Congential Abnormalities," with a cutoff date of November 1997, that showed 42 cases of congenital anomalies.

Parisian said this analysis was also never submitted to the FDA, as far as she knew, but under the rules it should have been.

Peavy then had Parisian review the draft version of the report, showing the same cutoff date and 42 congenital anomalies. On page 5, it stated: "The incidence rate of congenital abnormalities as observed in the data reported in this document is 13.3 percent."

But the draft version contained the following statements that did not appear in the final report: "A figure much higher than that reported by birth-defect monitoring bodies. Taken at face value, this represents an alarming finding."

Under FDA rules, drug companies are required to report alarming findings to the FDA, Parisian said. "They are also required to report any kind of safety analysis that they have done internally like this to address an issue about safety."

In fact, Peavy produced a 1984 letter to the company from the FDA, which specifically stated that the agency wanted to be informed about any "alarming findings" in either human or animal studies.

The 13.3 percent incident rate of congenital abnormalities was between six and seven times the 2.5 percent overall birth defect rate you would expect to see for births in the US, Parisian told the jury. The CDC uses a 2.5 percent background rate.

A 13.3 percent rate "would be a type of signal that a manufacturer should address," she testified.

Another exhibit reviewed for the jury showed the Japanese had received 27 reports of congenital abnormalities since December 1998 and they were requesting more information about safety, and included emails written by Glaxo employees, Ann Bell and Narita San.

An email written by Narita San stated in part: "This is unexpected number of reports, because only 50 cases were reported in the previous position paper. I think we have to take this abrupt increase of reports into consideration to the reply."

Parisian explained that "the Japanese are saying that they have received 27 reports of congenital anomalies and they want an update on the prior information."

In 2000, another internal report of the adverse events for pregnancy outcomes was completed by Doctor Stephen Hughes, Ms Easterbrook and Ms Caley, the worldwide clinical safety group, updating the report made in 1998, Parisian said.

The analysis, with a cutoff date of March 2000, showed Glaxo knew the outcome of 656 pregnancies, out of a total of 1,189 known Paxil pregnancy exposures. By then, there were 79 reports of congenital abnormalities, meaning 12 percent of pregnancies with known outcomes resulted in birth defects.

It was possible that some of the babies in the pregnancies with unknown outcomes also had birth defects, Parisian said. "They are unknown what they had."

While testifying, Parisian was asked to explain the general rule of
"underreporting."

It is general "knowledge that adverse events that the FDA receives are underreported," she said. "The FDA's numbers range from 1 to 10 percent."

So the FDA looks at the adverse event reports they receive as the tip of the iceberg, "maybe 10% of the reports that are actually out there," she pointed out.

If talking about underreporting figures for 79 cases of congenital defects, she said, "that would be 1 percent maybe to 10 percent, which would be 7,900."

"That would be babies that actually lived to getting born," she told the jury. "That's nothing to do with the miscarriages and what is not known."

The reports discussed during her testimony, "were not your classic safety analysis," Parisian explained. They were a "reporting or a tabulation of what information the company had."

They were being prepared for the Japanese because the Japanese government wanted safety information on pregnancy outcomes and they were also concerned about "late pregnancy, what the behavior would be of the baby when the baby was born if the mother was taking Paxil," she told the jury.

But under the rules, Glaxo was required to turn over any internal safety reviews, reports, and analysis to the FDA, Parisian told the jury, "particularly with pregnancy, which the FDA has been asking for information since the product was approved."

None of the analyses were turned over to the FDA, according to the testimony of Glaxo employees, Parisian said.

Under cross-examination, Glaxo attorney, Joe O'Neil, asked Parisian to identify the FDA regulation she was referring to in stating the reports should have been submitted to the FDA. "I would specifically use (21 CFR) 314.81," she said, "FDA talks about issues with children, information about children that they are to receive that information."

"Also, as a postmarket study asked (for) by the Japanese which is the 2000 report," she stated. "That would be under (21 CFR) 314.80."

While cross-examining Parisian, O'Neil put up a power point slide listing the FDA approvals of Paxil and Paxil CR, the controlled release version, for additional indications between the initial approval for major depression disorder in 1992 through 2004, including panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, general anxiety disorder, and PSTD.

Several times, Parisian noted that Paxil was not approved for use by pregnant women. O'Neil pointed out that for each new indication, FDA approved the label and Paxil was never contraindicated for use by pregnant women on the label.

Under redirect examination, Parisian testified that when Glaxo applied for approval of the new indications, the FDA was not given the internal analysis of birth defects available at the time or told about Dr Baldwin's comments on the early animal studies.

Although the 2000 report with 79 cases of birth defects was supposedly done for the Japanese government, it was never given to the Japanese, Tracey told the jury in closing arguments. "It wasn't given to the people it was prepared for," he said.

And after the report in 2000, Glaxo stopped doing the pregnancy analysis, he said. "For the next five years we have nothing," he told the jury. "We don't have any reports. We don't know how many birth defects are reported to them."

FDA Stamped Paxil Label

Glaxo's lead attorney in the Kilker trial was King & Spalding partner, Chilton Varner.

In her closing argument, Varner stated: "FDA repeatedly reviewed and approved the safety of Paxil, including the scientific data and the animal tests, 13 different times between 1992 and 2004."

In his final summation, Tracy told the jury: "Ms. Varner has said time and time and time again the FDA rubber-stamped" the label.

"What we know is the FDA didn't have all their information," he said.

"The FDA didn't know what they thought about the animal studies," he stated. "The FDA didn't know the analysis they had done."

"And one thing you need to understand is to this day, the FDA still hasn't seen these documents," Tracey told the jury.

"To this day, only my experts have seen the internal GSK documents," he said. "To this day, you are the only people outside of this courthouse that have laid eyes on these documents."

"These documents were under seal until this trial began," he pointed out.

Evelyn Pringle

(The Paxil Birth Defect Litigation Update Series is sponsored by the
Houston law firm of Vickery, Waldner and Mallia at www.justiceseekers.com )

(Evelyn Pringle is an investigative Journalist and Researcher focused on
exposing corruption in government and corporate America)

----

Fid

ORDER THE PAPERBACK
'THE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, IS CLEAR...THE SEROXAT SCANDAL' By Bob Fiddaman
SIGNED COPIES HERE OR UNSIGNED FROM CHIPMUNKA PUBLISHING

Monday, February 22, 2010

Glaxo Birth Defect Litigation Reveals Paxil Promoters on Speed Dial



Part III of Evie Pringle's investigation into GlaxoSmithKline, Paxil, [Seroxat] children born with defects and payments made to key opinion leaders [KOLs]



Evie has given me permission to publish this, her third article on this matter, in its entirety.

Part I can be read HERE
Part II HERE



Glaxo Birth Defect Litigation Reveals Paxil Promoters on Speed Dial

In the first Paxil birth defect trial against GlaxoSmithKline, much of evidence focused on the doctors on Glaxo's payroll involved in the corruption of the medical literature and seminars given to promote the off label use of Paxil with pregnant and nursing mothers.

On October 13, 2009, the trial of Kilker v Glaxo ended with a Philadelphia jury awarding $2.5 million in compensatory damages to the family of Lyam Kilker, after finding that Glaxo “negligently failed to warn” the doctor treating Lyam's mother about the risks of Paxil and the drug was a “factual cause” of the child's heart defects.

Glaxo's lead attorney at trial was King & Spalding partner Chilton Varner, and the family's lead attorney was Sean Tracey from Houston.

During his opening statement on September 15, 2009, Tracey told the jury that Doctor David Healy is “one of the most, if not the (most) world-recognized expert on pharmaceutical industry influence and the medicine, he is up there in the top five.”

Healy “is going to explain to you how GSK corrupted the medical literature,” he said, “how they used their money and influence to have doctors that they paid put out literature into the world so doctors ... could read literature that looked like literature, looked like science, smelled like science, appeared to be science, from very important people, people that were on boards, people that were professors, people that published hundreds of articles.”

Healy is going to explain to you that what they didn't tell people ... “is, we are paying these doctors to do all these things,” Tracey told the jury.

“There is a book, it looks like a telephone book,” he said, “of names of doctors, influential doctors, on their payroll, the names of these doctors you will see on this literature that looks and smells like science.”

“And just coincidentally, this science that they are going to parade before you, all seemed to help them,” he told the jury. “Some of this happened in the last couple weeks before this trial started.”

Advisory Panels and KOLs
While testifying, Tracey had Healy explain the concept of key opinion leaders (KOLs) and drug company advisory boards.

“When a pharmaceutical company is bringing a drug to market,” Healy said, “a few years before they bring the drug to the market they look at the academic physicians in the field and work out who will be the key people who will be the advocates for the drug.”

“They recruit advisory panels for the drug, which will be senior figures within the field who they believe they will be able to depend on to persuade the rest of their colleagues to think seriously about using this drug,” he noted.

In explaining a “national” advisory board, Healy said, when “a drug comes to market, they will have a range of senior people in the field, it could be 10 or 12 different people from different parts of the country whom they think are going to be the most influential in helping to get their drug moving within the market here in the U.S. or the U.K.”

“Then there is a further group of people down below,” Healy said, “who are called the key opinion leaders or KOL for short.”

“These, again, are fairly senior doctors,” he told the jury. “These are the people whom it is thought will go out and give lectures on the drug to the doctors who are actually doing most of the prescribing of the drug.”

In the early 1990s, Healy was on a Paxil advisory board around the time the drug was launched in the UK. People who did not think Paxil was a great product would usually be dropped from the advisory panel, he told the jury.

In fact, Tracey produced a Glaxo memo that stated: “if after this meeting anyone on the advisory board who doesn't passionately believe Paxil's uniqueness for anxiety should quietly be replaced.”

Naming Names
During the trial, Tracey wanted Healy to specifically testify about Doctors, Charles Nemeroff and Zachery Stowe, and apparently Glaxo did not want the jury to hear the sordid tale because their attorneys strongly objected.

On September 16, Tracy argued his case to the judge in chambers outside the hearing of the jury. “Doctor Nemeroff is generally considered, or was before his fall from grace, the most powerful man in psychiatry in the United States,” Tracey told the judge.

“Doctor Healy is uniquely qualified to talk about Doctor Nemeroff's role in the corruption of medical literature related specifically to Paxil as orchestrated by GSK and Doctor Nemeroff,” he argued.

“Same with Doctor Stowe,” Tracey said. “Doctor Stowe specifically carried out a campaign to market through GSK or GSK through Doctor Stowe to pregnant women and women of childbearing age.”

“I need to show the jury that an enormous amount of money changed hands between Stowe and Nemeroff and others,” he said, “and that all of these doctors were on GSK's Paxil advisory board.”

“It goes to the credibility of these doctors,” Tracey pointed out.

“These are the doctors that are writing the literature that is out there in the peer reviewed literature that doctors are relying on,” he told the judge.

These doctors were required ethically “by their universities to disclose to the Federal Government how much money GSK was paying them,” Tracey said. “They did not do that.”

He also wanted the jury to know that “Emory University has actually stripped Doctor Nemeroff of his chair over this very issue of failing to disclose payments from GSK,” he told the judge.

Tracey wanted to prove these allegations with testimony from Healy about Senator Charles Grassley's investigation of Nemeroff and Stowe and the results that were made public. In the end, the judge refused to allow Healy to testify about the amounts Nemeroff and Stowe were paid by Glaxo, why Nemeroff lost the chairmanship, or the disciplining of Stowe.

“Whether or not Emory had a battle with them about disclosure is not relevant in my mind,”the judge told Tracey. “What is relevant is that they were prominent individuals who wrote in favor of this drug, that they were on the advisory board, that they received honorariums of money, and that he believes in his opinion that these articles are wrong that they wrote.”

“He can offer his opinion that they were wrong and why they were wrong,” he said. “I am going to keep out the argument about the doctors being sanctioned for failing to disclose.”

Nemeroff's “credibility from Emory would involve a mini trial of the issue with Emory and him,” the judge said.

The Emory investigation, in fact, found Nemeroff was paid more than $960,000 by Glaxo, from 2000 through 2006, but listed less than $35,000 on his disclosure forms. All totaled, he had earnings of $2.8 million from speaking and consulting arrangements with drug companies between 2000 and 2007, but failed to disclose at least $1.2 million, according to Senate Finance Committee reports.

In 2008, Stowe was the primary investigator for a National Institutes of Health grant where the stated purpose was “to stimulate vigorous debate with the emphasis on the reproductive safety of antidepressant medications,” according to a June 2, 2009 letter to the president of Emory from Grassley.

Glaxo paid Stowe $154,400 for fifty-seven promotional talks in 2007. He also received $99,300 from Glaxo in the first ten months of 2008 for thirty-eight talks for antidepressants, according to Grassley.

During a deposition, Stowe testified that around “80% of his Emory salary ($187,000) comes from his NIH grants,” the letter notes. His total Emory salary was $232,000.

In a June 11, 2008 statement on the Senate Floor, in describing his investigation, Grassley said, “I have been looking at how drug companies try and influence medical care in America. Companies can do this by, for example, creating studies favorable to their drugs, by hiring doctors to promote their products, and in some cases even intimidating critics of their drugs.”

On this date, Grassley was announcing his investigation of Glaxo regarding revelations in reports filed in Paxil suicide litigation by Dr Joseph Glenmullen, showing the company had manipulated the numbers on adverse events related to suicidality in clinical trials all the way back in 1989, before the drug was FDA approved, to make it appear that Paxil did not increase the risk of suicidal behavior when, in fact, trial subjects on Paxil were eight times more likely to attempt or commit suicide than patients taking a placebo.

“So what did GlaxoSmithKline do with these reports?” Grassley said. “Well, the company tried to hide them.”

“They went to the judge and asked to have Dr. Glenmullen's report and all the confirming documents placed under seal-that means that no member of the public could see them,” he said. “In fact, Glaxo has been doing everything possible to ensure that this information remains under court seal.”

“It seems to me that GlaxoSmithKline tried to hide these reports because they seem to demonstrate what the company knew-that Paxil was associated with an increased risk of suicide based on the company's own studies,” Grassley noted.

“Essentially, it looks like GlaxoSmithKline bamboozled the FDA,” he pointed out.

For easy reference, psychiatric academics identified by Grassley's investigation to date, as not fully disclosing money from drug companies, include Joseph Biederman, Thomas Spencer and Timothy Wilens at Harvard, Charles Nemeroff and Zackery Stowe from Emory; Melissa DelBello at the University of Cincinnati; Alan Schatzberg, president of the American Psychiatric Association, from Stanford; Martin Keller at Brown University; Karen Wagner and A John Rush from the University of Texas; and Fred Goodwin, the former host of the radio show, “Infinite Minds,” broadcast for years by National Pubic Radio, before it was thrown off the air.

Paxil All-Star Team
During direct examination of Healy, Tracey introduced an exhibit on a 2002 forum called, “Perspectives on Psychiatry for the Future, Summary of Program Evaluations,” along with a list of doctors who gave presentations.

“What I would like to do is use this document to prove that these are a list of doctors that are out promoting Paxil for the defendant, and to have Dr. Healy explain, as he has published, how GSK sought to change the culture of how doctors view Paroxetine and pregnancy,” he told the judge.

Tracey went through several of the presentations and named off doctors that included Daniel Christensen, Zachary Stowe, Philip Perera, Dean Hamer, Dwight Evans, Karen Wagner, Katherine Beebe, and Prakash Masand.

Healy said he believed that most of the doctors mentioned were on the Paxil speaking team.

Zachary Stowe was listed for a presentation on the topic of, “Use of Antidepressants in Pregnant and Breastfeeding Women.”

Page 10 of the document asked: “As a result of the program, what changes, if any, will you make in your practice?”

Healy testified that after talks at this type of program, the audience will be asked to rate the points that are made. Tracey read some of the comments made by doctors attending the seminar, which included: “Possibly less fearful of treating pregnant women,” “Increased comfort in treating pregnant women,” “Increase use of Paxil - Will reassess the use or nonuse of SSRIs in pregnant/lactating clients,” and “More aggressive in treatment of special population, children and pregnant women.”

Healy testified that this document supported his opinion that Glaxo did influence doctors' prescribing practices with respect to Paxil and pregnancy and “they were quite successful at this.”

“I don't think you can find a single comment which says, I will be more cautious about treating pregnant women with Paxil,” he pointed out.

The jury was also shown a “Protocol” where Stowe had applied to Glaxo for funds to do research on the issue of Paxil in breast milk. Under the objectives for performing the study, there were five possible boxes to check, and Glaxo checked the box for “image enhancement.”

Healy knew of no article that ever appeared in peer-reviewed literature or was published in a reputable journal where the author said the purpose of the study was image enhancement. The odds of getting a paper published in a leading journal “would be remote to nonexistent,” if you told the journal that the reason for the study was to enhance the image of the drug, he said.

Tracey then introduced a January 10, 2000 email from Jillian, at the Cohn and Wolfe PR firm, to Scott Sproull and others at Glaxo, that showed Stowe was going on a publicity tour and would issue a press release for the Paxil breast milk study on Emory letterhead to lend credibility to the study in the media.

The email stated: “Scott, please review the attached press release and forward me any comments or edits.”

“As you may know,” Jillian said, “Dr. Stowe is on board for publicity efforts and Sherrie and I are coordinating time to meet with him next week to arm him with key messages for this announcement, which is slated for February.”

“We are sending the release for his review at the same time in efforts to secure distribution on Emory letterhead,” the email said, “as you know would provide further credibility to data for media.”

Healy had never hired PR firms to disseminate his published literature or lent his name to go on publicity tours for drug companies, he told the jury.

Tracy presented another protocol for a Paxil study, with Stowe as the investigator, where the objective checked was again “image enhancement.” As a scientist looking at the design of this protocol, Healy said, “this appears to be part of the positioning of Paxil as a drug that will be favorable to women of childbearing years.”

The budget for the study showed that Glaxo would pay $600 for each patient enrolled and the cost would be about $9,000.

Prior to 2005, Healy testified, he was not aware that Glaxo “spent any money to actually determine if the drug could be causing birth defects in human children.”

Tracey produced another document from a September seminar held in Philadelphia, at which Kimberly Yonkers was speaking to a Women's Health Advisory Board. Healy said Yonkers was a professor of psychiatry from Yale University and she was on Glaxo's Women's Health Advisory Board.

He told the jury that Yonkers was particularly influential “from the point of view of issues to do with women's mental health.”

Glaxo's Speed Dial
During the trial, Tracey wanted to use an exhibit that he referred to as a “telephone book,” full of influential doctors on Glaxo’s speakers' bureau for Paxil and have Healy go through some of the names.

“What I would like to do is put it into the record and have him identify who these people are,” Tracey explained to the judge in chambers, outside the hearing of the jury.

“Many of them are influential psychiatrists who have published on Paxil,” he said. “I want him to go through seven or eight names so later when the jury hears literature by these authors they will be able to put it into context.”

What I am going to do “is show the jury how all-encompassing their strategy for identifying and cultivating psychiatrists were in the country,” Tracey said.

“That's part of Doctor Healy's opinion,” he said, “how they identified these hundreds of doctors across the country to change the culture that existed.”

While Healy was testifying, Tracey introduced the 171 page list and had Healy identify some of the doctors.

Healy testified that Lori Altshuler is “a figure who is very well known in the field of women's mental health and would have written some key articles on the idea that it may be appropriate to use antidepressant drugs for women who are pregnant.”

He identified Vivian Burt as “a person who is a fairly big name in the women's mental health field and, again, a person who is an advocate for using antidepressants in women of childbearing years, and in particular, has talked regularly about the use of Paxil for women of childbearing years.”

He said Lee Cohen had been on the Paxil advisory board. “Dr. Cohen wrote an article that has since become quite famous,” he told the jury. “It became famous not because of the contents of the article, but because Dr. Cohen and co-authors, most of whom are on this list, failed to disclose the links to GSK or the other companies in the field that they had.”

Some of Cohen's co-authors on this study titled, “Relapse of Major Depression During Pregnancy in Women Who Maintain or Discontinue Antidepressant Treatment,” included Lori Atshuler, Vivian Burt, Jeffrey Newport, Zachary Stowe, and Aadele Viguera.

On July 11, 2006, with the headline, “Financial Ties to Industry Cloud Major Depression Study,” the Wall Street Journal reported that, “the study and resulting television and newspaper reports of the research failed to note that most of the 13 authors are paid as consultants or lecturers by the makers of antidepressants,” and “the authors failed to disclose more than 60 different financial relationships with drug companies.”

Most of the authors, the Journal said, were psychiatrists at Harvard’s Massachusetts General Hospital, Emory University, and the University of California Los Angeles.

The Journal noted that Cohen was a longtime consultant to three antidepressant makers, a paid speaker for seven, and had research funded by four drug companies. Adele Viguera, associate director of the Mass General perinatal psychiatry program and professor at Harvard, failed to disclose a paid speaking relationship with Glaxo.

Lori Altshuler, director of the Mood Disorders Research Program at University of California Los Angeles, failed to disclose that she was a speaker or consultant for at least five antidepressant makers. "Two of her colleagues -- Vivien Burt and Victoria Hendrick -- were also authors who didn't report financial relationships they have with antidepressant makers," the Journal reported.

In an expert witness report for the Novak Paxil birth defect case, Dr Dee Mangin points out that: “The Cohen study was not a controlled study, used a highly selected population likely to have a high relapse rate and not representative of a primary care patient population.”

“In addition,” she said, “it is not clear that subjects had a tapered withdrawal, which would increase the likelihood of misclassification of withdrawal symptoms as relapse.”

Mangin reports that in the year the study was published, one KOL (with the name redacted), received $72,000 from Glaxo in the first 6 months of 2006 alone, for giving 28 talks, which works out to $2,880 per talk.

The next name on the list read to the jury was Katherine Wisner, “a figure who has published quite extensively on the issue of it being often quite good to treat women of childbearing years and even women who are actually pregnant with antidepressants,” Healy said.

“She puts forward the point of view that it may be more harmful to leave the condition untreated,” he told the jury.

Charles Nemeroff's name was on page 110. “He was probably the leading figure in the field or the leading person on this list,” Healy said.

Zachary Stowe was on page 151, and last name read was Kimberly Yonkers. Healy called her “extremely influential.”

Convenient Report Appears
During cross-examination, Varner asked Healy about a report that was co-published in the journals, Obstetrics and Gynecology and General Hospital Psychiatry, in September 2009, the very month that the first Paxil birth defect trial was scheduled to start, which she claimed was a joint statement from the American Psychiatric Association and the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology.

The report was titled, “The Management of Depression During Pregnancy.” “The purpose of this deliberation,” Varner said to Healy, “was to come up with a statement from those two organizations that would assist prescribers in making their decisions about how to treat depression min pregnant women, correct?”

“We do not know that this was endorsed by APA,” Healy said. “We don't know if it was endorsed by ACOG.”

“We don't know whether it was a collection of individuals who just got together and because they belonged to both APA and ACOG, thought that they could put this kind of title on the piece,” he told the jury.

“It's correct, is it not,” Varner asked Healy, “that ACOG and APA describe some of the risks that were found (with SSRIs) that were, quote, extremely small and not replicated by other studies?”

“It's not correct to say that at all,” Healy said. “APA and ACOG have not said this.”

“What you got is a number of authors here who are linked to either APA or ACOG who have said this,” he told Varner. “The reason that I make this point is I have been party to processes like this on behalf of the British Association for Psychopharmacology and I can tell you exactly, if you want, how statements like this arise.”

“I'm not asking that,” Varner stated, cutting Healy off.

In fact, during the trial, the jury saw a January 2009 paper published in the ACOG Journal, by authors from Yale, in which Paxil was number two on a list of commonly prescribed “teratogenic” drugs.

It should also be noted that in 2006, about 30% of the American Psychiatric Association’s $62.5 million in financing, came from the pharmaceutical industry, which means the group received close to $19 million from drug companies in 2006 alone.

During Healy's testimony, Varner read a portion of the study that stated: “While some linked database reports find that compared to unexposed offspring, those exposed to Paroxetine during the first trimester are at higher risk. These results are disputed by other reports including several large case cohort studies.”

The actual study lists citations to papers that supposedly support this statement, which included papers by Louik and Alwan. On redirect, Tracey asked Healy: “Do those two papers stand for that proposition?”

“No, they don't,” Healy said. “They both show an increase in risk with Paxil.”

Tracey pointed out that this study “curiously enough came out this month.”

“It did,” Healy said. “This was quite curious in its own right.”

They then went over the names of some of the authors that were not read during Varner's questioning. Authors one and two were Kimberly Yonkers and Katherine Wisner. Healy testified that Yonkers and Wisner are affiliated with Glaxo and Yonkers was part of the women's health advisory board for Paxil. “They have been strongly associated with efforts to change the cultures,” he told the jury.

The disclosures for the study showed Wisner was on the speaker's board of Glaxo and Yonkers had received a research grant from Eli Lilly in the past year and had received a study drug from Pfizer for a National Institute of Mental Health trial.

Tracey noted that Glaxo was not mentioned in Yonkers' disclosures. “It's curiously not,” Healy said.

A likely explanation for Yonkers' non-disclosure is that she is a member of the DSM-V Task Force and according to the conflict of interest statement on the Task Force website, “Yonkers has agreed that, for the calendar year 2007 and continuing for the duration of her work on the DSM-V Task Force, her aggregate annual income derived from industry sources (excluding unrestricted research grants) will not exceed $10,000 during any calendar year.”

Diana Dell and Nada Stotland, the past president of the APA, were also co-authors and online disclosures show them listed as members of Glaxo speaker's bureau.

A website called “Bio-med Experts,” contains papers authored or co-authored by Yonkers. A “preview profile” lists Yonkers' co-publications with Katherine Wisner, Viguera Adele, Lori Altshuler, Diana Dell, Nata Stotland and a total of five with Lee Cohen.

She also co-authored 12 papers with Martin Keller, six with John Rush, and several with Allen Schatzberg and Zachary Stowe, all of whom were exposed by Grassley's investigation as not properly disclosing all of their financial benefits from drug companies.

Throughout the trial, Glaxo maintained that it did not market Paxil to women of childbearing years or pregnant women. In fact, in her opening statement, Varner told the jury: “You will hear from that chair the folks who made the marketing decisions at GSK.”

“They will tell you that GSK did not, repeat, did not target pregnant women, did not target women of childbearing age,” she said.

Yet, in a 2003 supplement titled, “Special Issues Related to the Treatment of Depression in Women,” for the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, Yonkers published an article derived from the teleconference, “Treating Depression: New Choices for a Chronic Problem,” supported by an unrestricted educational grant from Glaxo, which promoted the use of SSRIs by women from youth to old age.

In the conclusion section, Yonkers wrote, “SRIs (SSRIs) appear to be an efficacious treatment for women suffering from various depressive disorders throughout the life cycle. These agents have expanded treatment options for many women, especially women who experience intermittent symptoms such as with PMDD, and side effects of SRIs are typically less severe than those of TCAs.”

“SSRIs appear to improve depressive symptoms in pregnant women and women suffering from postpartum depression, and they are a relatively safe option for breastfeeding mothers,” she said. “Additionally, their effectiveness appears to be enhanced by estrogen, making them a favorable treatment option for older women suffering from postmenopausal depression.”

In 2004, Yonkers, Cohen, and authors that included two Glaxo employees, published a paper in, “Psychosomatic Medicine,” on a study titled, “Paroxetine Controlled Release for Premenstrual MDysphoric Disorder: A Double-Blind, Placebo Controlled Trial.”

In the November 1, 2006 issue of “Journal of Women’s Health,” Yonkers, Cohen and others, published a paper titled, “Expert Guidelines for the Treatment of Severe PMS, PMDD, and Comorbidities: The Role of SSRIs.”

This work was supported by an educational grant-in-aid from Glaxo, the disclosure advised. “Several treatment modalities are beneficial in PMDD and severe PMS, but the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) have emerged as first-line therapy,” the abstract states.

“A burgeoning body of literature has emerged that supports the role of the SSRIs as first-line treatment of PMDD and severe PMS,” the authors wrote in the discussion section.

Back in December 2005, Yonkers was out doing damage control for Glaxo when the FDA changed the Paxil pregnancy category from C to D, and warned that, “studies in pregnant women (controlled or observational) have demonstrated a risk to the fetus,” and said the FDA “has determined that exposure to paroxetine in the first trimester of pregnancy may increase the risk for congenital malformations, particularly cardiac malformations.”

On December 14, 2005, the Washington Post wrote, Kim Yonkers “cautioned that the database studies that the FDA had used had limitations: Unlike controlled studies, Paxil may have been prescribed far more than other drugs, skewing the results.”

She also claimed the databases sometimes concealed unrelated medical problems that could alter outcomes, the Post reported.

“Depression is still undertreated,” Yonkers said. “Pregnant women in particular are immensely undertreated, and you worry about people being unduly frightened.”

Yonkers' September, 2009 report noted that in 2003, approximately 13% of pregnant women took an antidepressant sometime during their pregnancy. There are over 4 million babies born each year in the US, according to the CDC, which means about 520,000 pregnant women took antidepressants in 2003, and that would only cover live births. There is no telling how many infants may have died before birth, Mas a result of their mother's use of SSRIs.

In 2006, Yonkers became president of the North American Society for Psychosocial Obstetrics and Gynecology, after Diana Dell turned the job down. The April 2006 Spring Newsletter discussed this group's annual meeting, held in Hawaii no less. “The symposia at our 33rd Annual Meeting were fabulous, and we all appreciated the luxurious hotel and beautiful Big Island’s many charms,” the newsletter stated.

“Kim Yonkers’ unending drive, and with significant assistance from Meir Steiner and Claudio Soars culminated in our Sponsors contributing generously towards the symposia,” it said. The sponsors listed Mincluded the drug companies Berlex, Sepracor, and Wyeth.

Although the judge ruled that Healy could not elaborate on the Nemeroff and Stowe saga, during cross examination, Varner opened the door a crack by directly asking Healy about the reputations of the various doctors shown to be on Glaxo's payroll.

“The last question I have about the documents that you reviewed with Mr. Tracey yesterday goes to the portion of your testimony when you and Mr. Tracey talked about various doctors who had received honoraria from GSK for various speaking engagements,” she said.

“And you listed Doctor Altshuler, Doctor Wisner, Doctor Burt, Doctor Yonkers, Doctor Cohen, Doctor Nemeroff, Doctor Stowe, and Doctor Szuba,” she pointed out.

“They are generally respected in the medical community?,” she asked Healy.

“The issue of the degree of respect within the medical community is one that's open to question at the moment,” Healy said.

“It would be interesting to know what the degree of respect for Doctor Nemeroff or Doctor Stowe in the medical community is at the moment,” he added.

The latest news on Nemeroff came on January 4, 2010, when Pharmalot carried the headline: “Charles Nemeroff and the House That Glaxo Built?”, and Ed Silverman wrote, “the controversial psychiatry professor who became a subject of a US Senate Finance Committee inquiry into academic research and pharma industry influence, is joining the University of Miami’s Miller School of Medicine.”

“Of course, this means leaving his previous job at Emory University in Atlanta and so he’s just purchased a $1.9 million house in the Coconut Grove section of Miami,” Silverman said. “The 5,204- square-foot home has six bedrooms and seven bathrooms,” according BlockShopper.

Nemeroff “came to the Senate committee’s attention because he was accepting sizeable consulting fees from Glaxo at the same that he was the primary investigator on an NIH-funded grant for research into a Glaxo drug,” he pointed out.

“In any event,” Silverman wrote, “the new home appears big enough to house plenty of consulting materials.”

Amazingly, none of the KOLs or advisory panel members on Glaxo's payroll discussed above, who are so “generally respected in the medical community,” according to Varner, were recruited to testify for Glaxo in the first birth defect trial.

Ghostbusting

Yonkers now works at Yale, but she received her medical training at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, and completed a residency and fellowship at McLean Hospital, Harvard Medical School. Lee Cohen and Adele Viguera are still at Harvard.

The month after the trial ended, in November 2009, Grassley sent letters to ten medical schools asking them to describe their policies on plagiarism and ghostwriting and to identify any complaints or investigations of faculty members dating back to 2004. The Universities included Columbia, Yale, Harvard, Duke, Stanford, Johns Hopkins, University of Pennsylvania, Washington University, University of California at San Francisco, and University of Washington.

“Essentially, the companies are using the reputation of prestigious academic researchers and their institutions to promote the sale of drugs and devices,” Grassley said in the letters.

“Articles published in medical journals are widely read by practitioners and are relied upon as being objective and scientific in nature,” he wrote. “The information in these articles can have a significant impact on doctors’ prescribing behavior and, in turn, on the American taxpayer, as the Medicare and Medicaid programs pay billions of dollars for prescription drugs and medical devices. "

“Any attempt to manipulate the scientific literature, which can in turn mislead doctors to prescribe treatments that may be ineffective and/or cause harm to their patients, is very troubling,” Grassley said.

“Students are disciplined for not acknowledging that a paper they turned in was written by somebody else,” Grassley said. “But what happens when researchers at the same university publish medical studies without acknowledging that they were written by somebody else?”

Back July 2009, Grassley asked eight medical journals to describe their policies and practices regarding ghostwriting. “Articles published in medical journals are widely read by practitioners and are relied upon as being objective and scientific in nature,” he said in letters to the journals. “Concerns have been raised, however, that some medical literature may be little more than subtle advertisements rather than independent research.”

On January 3, 2010, the New York Times ran the headline: “Harvard Teaching Hospitals Cap Outside Pay”. “Senior officials at the two hospitals, Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s Hospitals in Boston, must limit their pay for serving as outside directors to what the policy calls “a level befitting an academic role” — no more than $5,000 a day for actual work for the board,” reporter Duff Wilson wrote.

“Some had been receiving more than $200,000 a year,” he said. “Also, they may no longer accept stock. “

As an example, the Times noted that Dr Daniel Podolsky was the original chairman of the Partners policy commission in 2007, when “he was the chief academic officer at Partners and a $191,000-a-year board member at GlaxoSmithKline.”

Partners HealthCare is also forbidding speaker’s fees from drug companies for any employee, “including nearly 8,000 with Harvard faculty appointments,” the Times reported.

Evelyn Pringle
(The Paxil Birth Defect Litigation Update Series is sponsored by the Houston law firm of Vickery, Waldner and Mallia at www.justiceseekers.com)

(Evelyn Pringle is an investigative Journalist and Researcher focused on exposing corruption in government and corporate America)



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